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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the concerted efforts of recent Islamic scholarship to establish a distinct identity for Islamic 
economics, they have enjoyed little success in doing so. One of the most important reasons for this vision 
of Islamic sciences remaining unfulfilled is that scant attention has been paid to the critical role of 
epistemology in the founding of an academic discipline. Consequently, and not unlike the other areas of 
Islamic social science, Islamic Economics has remained embedded within the epistemological-ontological 
foundations of Occidentalism, thereby enslaving itself to the mainstream theories and tools of 
neoclassical microeconomics and Keynesian macroeconomics. This has been the central debility facing 
Islamic economists in establishing a distinct identity for their field of enquiry. This paper aims to highlight 
the importance of the relationship between epistemology, science, and Islamic economics. Only after this 
nexus is understood and appreciated, will it meaningful to articulate an episteme for Islamic economics, 
and to derive therefrom and construct thereupon a matrix of concepts, ontological categories and axioms 
apposite to that episteme. This is critical if Islamic economists and Muslim social scientists aspire to 
realise the objectives of Islam and avoid the pitfalls of their counterparts in the western world. They have 
to chart a new and fresh way forward for their science, consistent with a worldview based on Islam's 
authentic sources. 
 
Keywords: Epistemology, Paradigm, Science, Islam, Economics, Islamic Economics, Islamisation of 
Knowledge  
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Meskipun upaya-upaya terpadu pengetahuan Islami terkini untuk membangun suatu identitas yang 
berbeda bagi ilmu ekonomi Islam, ada sedikit keberhasilan dari upaya- upaya tersebut. Salah satu alasan 
yang paling penting untuk visi ilmu pengetahuan Islami yang masih belum diisi adalah minimnya 
perhatian yang ditujukan kepada peranan kritis epistemology dalam membentuk suatu disiplin akademik. 
Oleh karena itu, tidak seperti area-area lain dalam ilmu sosial Islami, Ekonomi Islam telah dan masih 
menyertakan dasar-dasar epistemology-ontology kebiasaan orang-orang barat (occidentalisme), 
sehingga masih terikat pada teori- teori arus utama dan perangkat ekonomi mikro neo-klasik dan dan 
ekonomi makro Keynesian. Hal ini menjadi kelemahan utama yang dihadapi oleh para ekonom Islam 
dalam membentuk suatu identitas yang berbeda dalam bidang penelitiannya. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk 
menekankan pentingnya hubungan antara epistemologi, ilmu pengetahuan, dan ekonomi Islam. Setelah 
keterkaitan ini dipahami dan disadari, hal ini akan memberi arti dalam mengartikulasikan suatu episteme 
bagi ekonomi Islam dan untuk memperoleh darinya dan kemudian mengkonstruksikan sebuah matrix 
konsep, kategori ontology dan aksioma yang tepat bagi episteme tersebut. Hal ini sangat mendesak jika 
para ekonom Islam dan para ahli ilmu sosial muslim bercita-cita untuk mewujudkan tujuan- tujuan Islam 
dan menghindari jebakan rekan- rekannya di dunia barat. Mereka harus merencanakan sebuah cara 
baru dan berbeda dalam memajukan ilmu pengetahuannya, konsisten dengan pandangan yang 
berdasarkan sumber-sumber Islam yang asli.  
 
Kata Kunci: Epistemologi, Paradigma, Ilmu Pengetahuan, Islam, Ilmu Ekonomi, Ekonomi Islam, 
Islamisasi Pengetahuan 
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INTRODUCTION 
Following the end of colonialism and the emergence of independent Muslim 
‘nations’ during the second half of the last century, the intelligentsia, social 
reformers and the general populace in these countries have been calling, 
incessantly, for a revival of their centuries-old Islamic values, institutions and 
normative practices. Guided by the rich intellectual-scientific history of early 
Muslim civilisation, and with the concomitant realisation that many of the 
challenges of modernity stem from its embrace of Western Rationalism, 
Islamic scholarship realised quickly that any endeavour towards the revival of 
Islam in its socio-scientific realms was contingent upon a critical re-
examination of key aspects of its knowledge enterprise (Iqbal, 2007; Sardar, 
1988). 
One of the fundamental points of agreement among Muslim intellectuals has 
been that there could be no dichotomy between the secular and sacred sciences 
in the Islamic scheme, and therefore no strict compartmentalisation of 
disciplines. Accordingly, there has been a concerted effort by these 
intellectuals to establish a framework of knowledge that is able to integrate 
both humanly-acquired and revealed sources of knowledge, generally not 
considered admissible as such in modern (Western) science. This attempt to 
reformulate the process of scientific inquiry became known in Islamic 
academic circles as the “Islamisation of Knowledge/Science (IOK/IOS)”. The 
social or human sciences were deemed most amenable to this paradigm shift, 
and consequently received the greatest amount of attention by scholars 
(Hussain, 2006). Islamising economics (and finance) is an extension of this 
intellectual effort and is, in fact, considered one of its most important pillars 
(Haneef, 2007; Hefner, 2006). In a sense then, it serves as an important test 
case of this ambitious project.  
The initial impetus for this intellectual movement was largely inspired by the 
writings of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) 
and Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938), Chapra (2008) dan Haneef (2007), whilst the 
first calls for developing Islamic economic theory specifically, came from 
Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), Abul Ala Mawdudi (d. 1979) and Baqir al-Sadr (d. 
1980) (Mahomedy, 2013). It was, however, left to the subsequent generation of 
thinkers1 to articulate in modern academic parlance the form, shape and content 
of the nascent enterprise of the ‘Islamic Sciences’. Chiefly among them are the 
                                                          
1 Interestingly, but not surprisingly, many in this group have received some form of academic 
training in the West.   
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likes of S.H. Nasr (1968), al-Attas (1978, 1985, 1986, 1995), (Al-Faruqi, 
1982), Sardar (1985, 1989) and Choudhury (1990, 2004, 2006, 2011).2  
But it was two international conferences following in quick succession in 1977, 
one on Muslim Education, in Saudi Arabia and the other on the Islamisation of 
Knowledge, in Switzerland that elevated the issue to one of global interest for 
Muslims throughout the world. Not only did it sensitise Muslim educators to 
reflect on how they approach the transferal of knowledge to learners but more 
importantly, it mobilised and ignited the conscience of many Muslim 
intellectuals to actively participate and contribute to the programme (Adebayo, 
2006). To further this research agenda, associations of Muslim intellectuals and 
professional bodies, Islamic research centres, and Islamic universities have 
been established in many Muslim countries to actively network and explore 
ways in which their disciplines and specialised fields of study could be 
‘Islamised’. Driven by a similar spirit, thousands of books, journal articles and 
numerous conferences, workshops and symposia, focussing especially on 
Islamic economics (IE), have all generated a vast body of literature in this area. 
The wave of enthusiasm spread far and wide such that even a country like 
South Africa, with its small minority Muslim population, had established its 
own Muslim professional bodies and was able to successfully host several 
international conferences in this regard. 
BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
It is now almost four to five decades since this enterprise was begun with 
earnestness and enthusiasm and which imbued within the Muslim psyche a 
renewed vigour and sense of mission (S.V.R. Nasr, 1991). But despite the 
plethora of writings in this cross- and multi-disciplinary project, has Islamic 
scholarship been able to actually deliver on its promises to revolutionise 
knowledge in the various domains of academic thought? Or at the very least, 
has even the ground-work been laid for the next generation of Muslim 
intellectuals to build upon that foundation? Hardly ten years had passed since 
the formal inauguration of the IOK agenda and many were already beginning 
to question the shape and form of the burgeoning enterprise unfolding in in its 
wake (Kirmani, 1989; Rahman, 1988; Sardar, 1988). Its application hitherto 
had been perceived to be so superficial and blinkered that alarm bells were 
raised that unless the “jejune nature of the [then] current approaches to the 
issue” was not fundamentally reconsidered, it would eviscerate the 
                                                          
2 There are some important differences though, among these scholars, on how this ought to be 
conceived and what the challenges are for its realisation. 
Abdulkader Cassim Mahomedy | Public Policy in Islamic Framework 
 
 
SHARE | Volume 4| Number 2| July – December 2015 
 
190 
“Islamization project of its creative potential” (S.V.R. Nasr, 1991). The fate of 
Islamic economics was specifically highlighted in this regard. In fact, so 
serious were the some of the objections raised at the time that concerns were 
expressed as to the very survival of the project itself (Haneef, 2005; S.V.R. 
Nasr, 1986).  
So did the proponents of IOK, particularly the Islamic economists, take heed of 
the critical advice to reflect on, and re-orientate their mission? Notwithstanding 
the well-intentioned attempt by those involved in this international drive, 
Muslim scholars who were deeply involved in it are of recent increasingly 
conceding that their efforts to recast modern science and its various sub-
disciplines within an Islamic “mould” have been misconceived, and that 
“something has gone wrong” (Chapra, 2000; Choudhury, 2001; Sardar, 2004; 
Siddiqi, 2008, 2011). Various explanations have been proffered for what 
Siddiqi (2008) laments as the “collapse of the grand Islamic agenda”. And 
again, Islamic economics was singled out as a case in point. 
That the discipline is at a crossroads and in a crisis of sorts is widely 
acknowledged and recognised (Al-Atas, 2006; Choudhury, 2008b; Haneef, 
2007; Khan, 2013; Kuran, 2004; Siddiqi, 2004; Zaman, 2011). IE has been 
heavily censured by both critics and proponents alike for failing to “articulate a 
sound and coherent theoretical paradigm for the discipline, let alone in 
demonstrating how it would ﬁnd practical expression in the real economy” 
(Mahomedy, 2013). Several international forums 3  have been subsequently 
convened to specifically address this issue. One of the central themes to 
emerge from these discussions is whether IE needs to be reconceived de novo, 
requiring a paradigm shift altogether or, alternatively, that it should continue to 
evolve within its current framework of classical-neoclassical-Keynesian 
economics and its body of concepts and methodologies. Clearly, the path that it 
adopts will once again, significantly influence the future trajectory of the 
growth of the discipline.  
Some scholars, such as Kahf (2004, 2012), Al-Jarhi (2004) and Zarqa (2004) 
argue that IE ought to remain within the purview of mainstream economics and 
that with relatively minor adjustments and modifications, the former can easily 
be accommodated within the latter. On the other hand, the more avant-garde 
Muslim intellectuals such as Choudhury (2006, 2008a), Nasr (1986, 1989), 
                                                          
3 E.g. workshops and seminars organised by the Islamic Research and Training Institute (in 
2004), by the Islamic Economics Research Centre (in 2008 and 2012), by the International 
Institute of Islamic Thought (in 2011) and most recently, by ILKE Association of Science 
Culture Education, among others, in Istanbu (in 2013). 
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Sardar (1988, 1989, 2004) and Zaman (2005, 2011) are vehemently opposed to 
developing IE as an off-shoot of mainstream economics. They aver that it is 
because of this slavish imitation of its Western counterparts that IE has 
dismally failed to achieve any degree of substantial success. Others yet, some 
of whom are pioneers in the field such as Siddiqi (1970) and Mannan (1970) 
favour a more circumspect approach in which the essential concepts of 
mainstream economic science ought to be juxtaposed and evaluated with those 
from within an Islamic framework and then subsequently integrated, modified 
(or rejected from) within IE theory. Invariably, a careful reading of most of the 
literature on Islamisation generally reveals similar fault lines on how to 
confront this challenge. And so, despite much constructive debate, both in 
terms of depth and breadth, still no consensus emerges on this crucial issue. 
One is therefore left wondering as to the reason/s for this lack of agreement on 
an axiomatic principle as fundamental as this. What might help to explain the 
failure on the part of these distinguished experts to agree on a unified approach 
at this critical juncture of their mission? It is the thesis of this paper that the 
reason for this divergence is that not everyone involved has paid adequate 
attention to the critical role of epistemology in the founding of an academic 
discipline, more especially in a project as ambitious as that of reconstructing 
human intellectual thought. It also helps to clarify why the vision of Islamic 
sciences generally has hitherto remained unfulfilled. 
That this indeed might be the case is somewhat surprising: after all, attempting 
to redefine the boundaries of knowledge and its sources and how they 
intermesh constitutes the very subject matter of epistemology, as will be 
detailed in subsequent sections. The founding fathers of the Islamisation 
project and even those that followed in more recent times such as Nasr, al-
Attas and Choudhury have all been too keenly aware of the indispensable need 
for scholars to fully engage with issues of epistemology and methodology. At 
inception they had already emphasised its importance for any meaningful 
construal and recasting of the knowledge enterprise anew, but how the import 
of this might have possibly slipped the Islamic economists is also an issue that 
I will revert to later.  
Given the primal role that epistemology plays, not only in the process of 
knowledge creation and its growth (K.R. Popper, 1959), but also in shaping the 
very ‘lenses’ through which we ‘see’ the world i.e. our world-view or 
weltanschauung (Dilthey, 1960), this study seeks to interrogate this central 
problem, which lies at the very heart of the agenda to establish a uniquely 
Islamic approach to economic issues.  The rest of this paper is therefore 
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structured as follows. I first explain the derivation and meaning of 
epistemology within the area of philosophical inquiry, after which I examine its 
need and significance as a discipline in itself and in relation to the other 
sciences generally. I then critically analyse the more recent effort to discredit 
the role of epistemology altogether and replace it with the philosophy of the 
physical sciences. Once these issue are clarified, I outline broadly some of the 
fundamental precepts underlying the epistemology of Islamic economics and 
then conclude by arguing why IE needs to clearly delineate its unique 
epistemological moorings and principles if it wishes to achieve its raison 
d’etre. 
EPISTEMOLOGY: DEFINITION, NEED AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Along with metaphysics4, logic5 and ethics6, epistemology is considered to be 
among the most distinguished branches of philosophical enquiry. 
Etymologically, it is derived from the Greek words epistēmē (“knowledge”) 
and logos (“reason”) and is often described as the theory of knowledge 
(Edwards, 1967). This (narrow) definition, however, does not adequately 
convey the comprehensive character of the discipline. Epistemology examines 
critically what actually constitutes knowledge (or not); what are its sources and 
means of derivation, and through which mechanisms and processes is it 
conveyed. Its task, accordingly, is (a) to interrogate the very building blocks of 
knowledge, that is, the concepts that form the basis of any scientific enquiry 
and how they were arrived at, (b) to explore the processes and methodology 
that is used to functionally relate concepts and similar to such constructs in 
other domains, (c) to seek criteria by which knowledge is justified, and finally, 
(d) to specify the limits to what is humanly knowable. Additionally, its role is 
also to distinguish between objective-subjective, positive-normative, and 
factual-hypothetical structures and ideas (Vollmer, 1987) or contrarily (à la 
post-modernists), to explore whether such polarities could even exist in the first 
place.  
If epistemology is to address human thought at such an elemental and 
foundational level as described above, then its connection to other areas in 
philosophy is inextricable. Views about the essential nature of reality 
(metaphysics), of which man is a part, will unavoidably influence his 
                                                          
4 A study of the ultimate structure and constitution of reality (as opposed to appearance). 
(Encyclopaedia_Britannica, 2010). 
5 The study of correct reasoning, especially as it involves the drawing of inferences. (Ibid). 
6 Moral Philosophy that seeks to determine the correct application of moral notions such as 
good and bad, and right and wrong (Encyclopaedia_Britannica, 2010). 
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perceptions on his ability or otherwise to make sense of that reality. How man 
then expresses and conveys this understanding and furthermore acts upon it, 
leads him into the field of semantics7  and ethics, respectively. If we affirm the 
presence of epistemic concepts of interaction, learning, discovery, growth, etc. 
then endogeneity and reciprocity of all of these areas of enquiry within human 
experience becomes well-established. With the specialisation of knowledge 
and its subsequent professionalization into formal disciplines, philosophers and 
practitioners of the different sciences may each wish to claim an epistemology 
distinct, and in some ways exclusive, to that discipline, an issue that I will 
revert to later. Consequently, on this account, there could arise an epistemology 
of religion, an epistemology of the (natural) sciences, of economics and so on 
(Choudhury, 2006).    
Given this rich and all-embracing purview of epistemology, its implications for 
all other socio-politico-scientific domains are far-reaching and profound. Not 
surprisingly, contemplation on epistemological questions has since time 
immemorial captured the minds of great thinkers in all civilizations. This 
incessant quest of man to discover the fundamental truths of his being and the 
universe around him stems from an inherent desire to move from conjectural 
states into ever increasing degrees of certainty. Ultimately, it is driven by a 
need to find meaning and purpose of man’s existence and the world around 
him. These insights then serve as a point of reference, an anchor as it were, to 
guide man towards purposive behaviour in relation to himself and to all other 
entities within the diverse world systems that he can potentially relate to. From 
this perspective alone, one may readily recognise the vital role that 
epistemology plays in providing for man a platform upon which he is able to 
live meaningfully in the world.     
At the time that the different areas of knowledge enquiry branched off into 
distinct and formal disciplines several centuries ago, there was deeply held 
view that for these sciences to gain legitimacy as such there was an 
indispensable need for a formal system of thought to evaluate the credentials of 
all knowledge propositions and to assess claims to their validity (Taylor, 1995). 
Epistemology was thus assured the natural candidacy to fill this niche and to 
perform the evaluative role required. For epistemology to be elevated to this 
supra-scientific status, that is, a meta-discipline, however, meant that it had to 
lay claim to an objective, universal and incorrigible set of epistemic principles 
and criteria that could serve as the definitive standard of truth. This traditional 
                                                          
7 A branch of philosophy dedicated to the study of language as a representation of reality. 
(Ibid) 
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character of the discipline formed the basis upon which Foundationalists8 chose 
to erect the entire edifice of ‘justified’ human knowledge. And hence, the 
metaphor of knowledge as a set of indubitable beliefs forming the foundation 
upon which the superstructure of other propositions are built and justified 
(Papineau, 1981). 
EPISTEMOLOGY CHALLENGED BY RATIONALIST SCIENCE AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMICS 
That epistemology is integral and indispensable to the construal of knowledge 
and the search for ultimate truth has, somewhat surprisingly, been challenged 
from the earliest of times by both classical and modern philosophers and 
scientists alike. From the ancient Greek sceptics of the Hellenistic tradition (see 
Palmer (2000) through Hume (1978), from G. W. F. Hegel, Findlay, and Miller 
(1977) through Heidegger (1978), Boltzmann (1974) and Ayer (1936), and 
more recently, Quine (1969, 1981) and Rorty (1979), have all disparaged, to 
varying degrees, the traditional conception and role of epistemology. In some 
writings Nielsen (1991), the very legitimacy of the discipline has been abjured 
and even parodied. Much of this critique represents a recent trend, particularly 
in Europe and America, that aims to strip epistemology of its pre-eminence 
and, perhaps more seriously, to repudiate the entire enterprise as a mistake 
altogether Taylor (1995), also McDermid (2000). I will elaborate on each of 
these arguments and their responses accordingly. 
The Sceptical Case 
The classic argument brought against the notion of a criterion of knowledge, 
first raised by early scepticism9 and later, in the writings of Hume, Hegel and 
Boltzmann is the apparent inability to prove unequivocally its universality and 
truth. This shortcoming leads to the ‘equipollence’ problem which manifests 
itself in two insuperable ways.10 Firstly, if there is such a criterion (of truth) 
then an alternative, contrary one may be advanced with an equal weight of 
justification as the other. Secondly, if epistemology is to specify a criterion to 
validate knowledge claims then that criterion would have to be considered a 
piece of knowledge as well Vollmer (1987), and hence also require 
                                                          
8 Those who maintain that all knowledge and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of 
non-inferential knowledge or justified belief (Fumerton, 2010 ). 
9 The Western philosophical school that adopted the attitude of doubting knowledge claims set 
forth in various areas (Encyclopaedia_Britannica, 2010). 
10 These were originally referred to as the fourth and second tropes of Agrippa, respectively 
Annas and Barnes (2000) and Forster (1998). 
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justification. If another criterion (again, a piece of knowledge?) is used to 
validate the earlier one, then it would also have to justified and the process 
could go on ad infinitum setting off an infinite regress. On this account, the 
dream of a first philosophy of knowledge becomes self-defeating and has to be 
abandoned as it fails on its own terms. The lofty perch upon which 
epistemology rests crumbles from within. 
Notwithstanding the logical validity11 of the tropes of Agrippa used to buttress 
the equipollence problem12, the following warrants careful consideration if we 
are to avoid the frustrating outcome it leads to. In any rational discourse on 
epistemology, human knowledge is both the subject and object of critique. 
Consequently, it is impossible to place a knowledge-induced process outside 
the circle of knowledge and then, via it, to return to it. As Russell (1952) 
argued, for participants to engage in any kind of refutation there has to be at 
least some piece of knowledge that is shared between them; that no meaningful 
result through engagement – the language-game – is conceivable from a state 
of blank doubt, and thus he warned against that strain of philosophy which 
leads to a destructive outcome of this sort. What this implies is that 
“epistemology does not prove the existence of knowledge, it presupposes 
knowledge” (Vollmer, 1987). It should not endeavour to prove that knowledge 
can or does exist anymore than semantics presupposes language without 
aiming to prove that languages exist. Neither stand in need of proving their 
areas of study. Engaging in a dialogue on either implies an acknowledgement 
of the existence of the subject matter at least. As G. Hegel and Wallace (1904) 
also maintained, it is absurd for an investigation of knowledge to be conducted 
prior to knowledge.  
The Rise of Positivism 
But apart from the equipollence problem, there is a more serious challenge 
against the traditional role of epistemology as described earlier. I address this 
issue in some detail because the implications of the arguments presented in its 
support are exploited by many in the Islamisation debate to argue that 
epistemological and methodological issues are uncontentious and consequently 
does not warrant any detailed critique or ‘reinvention’ see Furlow (2005).13 For 
example, Monzer Khaf, considered a pioneer in Islamic economics, has openly 
declared “I  do  not  believe  that  to  spend  much  time  on  Methodology  is 
                                                          
11 But not necessarily logically sound. 
12 See Footnote 11 above. 
13 See also Choudhury (1998) and Haneef and Furqani (2010) for a detailed discussion of 
earlier treatments on this aspect. 
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useful …[and] Methodology does not belong to Economics … [and] nor is 
empiricism in contradiction with our religion” (Kahf, 2012). Why, at a time 
when even Nobel laureates14 in economics and other leading institutions15 of 
mainstream economics have been appealing for a fundamental re-think on 
economics, does one still find disinterest and even resistance from the Islamic 
economists on this issue?  
That epistemological concerns  and questions relating methodology might 
serve no useful purpose to economics stems from a view that the modernist 
approach to science (including economics), its methodology and tools of 
analyses are value-free, ethically-neutral and objective (Putnam, 2002; Ravetz, 
1971; Weber, 1917). The notion that the scientific enterprise can be value free 
and universally generalizable was first popularised by Francis Bacon 16 , 
wherein he called for the mind to be free from all theoretical preconceptions 
i.e. cleared of all “idols” (Bacon, 1620). The cause was then taken up by 
Comte’s positivism in which he extended the project into the ‘social universe’, 
asserting that positivist science and its methodology could ultimately explain 
all phenomena, including human behaviour (Comte, 1908; Kincaid, 1998). In 
the first few decades of the last century, the logical positivists/empiricists, the 
intellectual successors to the positivists, Weber (1917) relentlessly pursued a 
crusade to unify and reduce all of the sciences, including the social sciences, to 
the language of mathematics and physics (Carnap, 1981; Hanfling, 1981).  
It was from this tradition that economics suffered a similar fate through the 
works of the likes of Samuelson (1947) and Friedman (1977), despite the 
objections of Myrdal (1958), Hutchison (1981) and Hodgson (1983, 1988) 
against this tendency. It still persists to be the dominant view today that 
economics is, and ought to be, a positive science, free of ethics and value 
judgments (Boumans & Davis, 2010; Klappholz, 1964; Rothschild, 1993).  
A key thread that runs throughout the positivists’ writings on the philosophy of 
science as it evolved over the decades was its emphasis on observability and 
the reduction of data to the physical realm only. By circumscribing the 
knowable domain to only that which is empirically testable, and hence 
verifiable through observational evidence, it was thought that the need for a 
First Philosophy of knowledge could be dispensed with. As noted by Caldwell 
                                                          
14 E.g. Stiglitz (Stiglitz, 2010). 
15 E.g. London  School  of  Economics (LSE, 2006) and The Center of  Religion, Economics 
and Politics, University of Basel in  Sweden (2011). 
16 A 17th century philosopher frequently considered to be the Father of the Modern Scientific 
method. 
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(1980) the agenda of the logical positivists was driven by a “fanatical… belief 
that their approach constituted the sole and ultimate end of philosophical 
analysis”, or, in the words of K. R. Popper (1959), by “their anxiety to 
annihilate metaphysics”. But they could not sustain the devastating critique 
from within the disciple itself (Suppe, 2000), Ayer (1959) in Zaman (2013), so 
that by the middle of the last century logical positivism experienced “a rather 
spectacular crash” (Van-Fraassen, 1980); see also Hempel (1974). Nonetheless, 
it continued to play a determining role in shaping the social sciences, 
particularly economics (Boland, 1991; Caldwell, 1994; McCloskey, 1983), and 
still persists to exert a pervasive influence on them (Fischer, 1998; Novick, 
1988; Overman, 1988). 
Naturalising Epistemology 
In response to the failure of positivism and all of its variants to supplant 
traditional epistemology with empiricism as the only basis for validating 
knowledge claims, an alternative approach to demarcate the relationship 
between science and epistemology had rapidly emerged and is presently 
gaining currency in epistemic circles (Crowley, 2005; Kertész, 2002). It is 
based on the works of Dewey (1903), Heidegger (1978) and Quine (1969, 
1981), who have all rejected the notion of a strict dichotomy between the 
human mind and the world it seeks to understand. They contend that human 
conception of an object derives from the interaction and engagement between 
the object and the mind, mediated accordingly through our senses (Quine, 
1969). But the knowledge gained however, is neither static nor fixed: it is 
provisional and arbitrary and subject to constant transformation and re-
conceptualisation iteratively as encounters between subject and object occur in 
different experiential contexts (Dewey, 1903). Simply, the external world as it 
is out there, cannot be objectively attested to outside of human cognition. This 
implies that there can be no apriori, permanent or infallible beliefs about 
anything at all. What role, then, for epistemology if there are no fundamental, 
objective truths about reality? In this scheme, epistemology becomes 
effectively stripped of its normative elements and its role, at best, limited to 
that of a descriptive discipline only (Kim, 1993). 
A ‘naturalised’ epistemology of this sort, especially of the form17 advocated by 
its leading proponent, Quine (1969), means that it loses its primacy and 
propaedeutic role among the other sciences. Quine (1981) is quite categorical 
on this: natural science is “not answerable to any supra-scientific tribunal, and 
                                                          
17 For other variants, see Feldman (2001). 
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not in need of any justification beyond observation and the hypothetico-
deductive method”. Science, accordingly, is a self-justifying process to be left 
unfettered by any supposedly, higher apriori criteria (McEvoy, 2002). Whilst 
Quine does not call for an outright banishment of epistemology altogether, as 
demanded by Nielsen (1991), he is willing to endorse the discipline but only on 
an equal footing alongside the other sciences, so that its serves the function of 
merely describing how we arrive at knowledge.  
But with this diminution of the discipline in which its apriori content is 
expunged, would it still serve the epistemological purpose?  Several of those 
opposed to this re-characterisation such as Kim (1993), Bonjour (1998) and 
Putnam (2004) argue that naturalised epistemology, in emptying itself of any 
kind of aprioritic assertions, will, in the process, become devoid of any 
usefulness for epistemic purposes (McEvoy, 2002). The central thrust in most 
of their critique is that the ideas of truth, justification and reliability are integral 
to the epistemological enterprise and is, in fact, its raison d'être.  Shorn of any 
normative content it loses its theoretical anchor and consequently, cannot 
conceivably fulfil its objective. At best, it is positivist in character, merely 
uncovering how we arrive at our beliefs. 
Quine and his adherents Papineau (1981) deny that their project is 
indiscriminately descriptive. But if there no apriori epistemic principles to 
guide scientific enquiry how then would justifiable and valid knowledge claims 
be distinguished from dubious ones? As a “truth-seeking technology”, in the 
sense in which Quine (1990) conceives of it, naturalised epistemology would, 
they contend, still be well positioned to discount assertions made by occultists, 
soothsayers, telepathists and the like. To perform this evaluative task and thus 
still serve many of the functions of traditional epistemology, it would draw 
upon the diverse sciences of psychology, neurology and physics (Quine, 1986). 
Effectively then, what is really proposed here, is in fact a reversal of the roles 
of epistemology as a discipline and the other sciences.18 The natural sciences 
would determine which avenues are conducive for knowledge acquisition and 
truth seeking from those that are to be discredited, and accordingly pronounce 
on their validity. As Woods (1989) asserts, this treatment of epistemology “is 
hardly more than positivism stripped down and retrofitted…without the 
trimmings… and no retreat to first principles”. The upshot of all of this, is 
simply that only science, and science alone, with its empirical method can 
serve as the ultimate arbiter of knowledge claims.  
                                                          
18 In a sense, as acknowledged by Papineau (1981), it may amount to placing the cart before 
the horse.   
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To summarise then on the above, one is led to conclude that from the sceptics 
and early empiricists (Hume) to those who succeeded them later (logical 
positivists) and naturalists  (Kitcher, 1992; Maffie, 1995; Quine, 1981), the 
attack on the traditional role of epistemology had never really abated, even post 
the official collapse19 of positivism. Similar arguments against the discipline, 
not considered in detail here for want of space and also because they broadly 
tend weave around the same themes, can also be found in the writings of  the 
epistemological relativists (Campbell, 1974), (pan)critical rationalists (K.R. 
Popper, 1959), and (neo)pragmatists (Rorty, 1979). 20  Whilst each of these 
positions tend to accentuate some aspects of the critique and attenuate others, 
one can discern the central thesis that binds them all together on this issue: the 
denunciation and repudiation, to varying degrees, of any form of commitment 
to apriorism in scientific thought.  
The scientific enterprise, it is argued, should not be encumbered with any form 
of externally imposed (i.e. presupposed) principles or antecedent commitments 
relating either to its content or methodology. Science therefore, should purge 
itself of all metaphysical notions (Zahar, 1977). But is it practically viable or 
even logically possible for scientific enquiry to be absolutely free of any 
assumptions or preconceptions, to be released tout court from any of its 
epistemological moorings and, in the tradition of Locke (1690 ), to proceed 
tabula rasa? It is to this issue that I now turn to. 
CAN SCIENCE BE FREE OF METAPHYSICS AND 
PRESUPPOSITIONS? 
Since Kuhn’s (1962) and Feyerabend’s (1975) celebrated publications of their 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) and Against Method (1975), 
respectively, and the post-modernist/social-constructivist critique of modernist 
science that exploded in its wake (Knorr-Cetina, 1981, 1999; Rosenau, 1992), 
the notion of a value-free science, for both the natural and social sciences, has 
been hotly debated in the literature cf. Proctor (1991), and Kincaid, Dupré, and 
Wylie (2007). But the ontological foundations and methodological 
presuppositions integral to the practice of modern science has not received the 
same degree of attention. For a long time it was therefore maintained that 
science as a realm, in its search for truth, could still be impartial and 
ideologically neutral (Agazzi, 2014).  Consequently, the belief still persists in 
both intellectual circles and the popular mind that science presents to us an 
                                                          
19 Suppe (2000) marks this date as the 26 March 1969. 
20 One may also, in this context, mention the works of the post-modernists/post-structuralists 
e.g. Derrida (1973) and Foucault (1980), but these are of a different genre.   
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objective or disinterested view of the world, or as appropriately described by 
Nagel (1986), a “view [of] the world from nowhere within it … [but]… outside 
of ourselves” or over it.  
The misconception that the natural sciences in particular are largely 
aperspectival and pure ‘in itself’ is widespread and stems from the mistaken 
assumption that modern science is presuppositionless and that its only 
distinction is its empirical method. Kuhn (1962) work brought to the fore, 
among other ideas (some what controversial at the time) that normal work-a-
day scientific practice occurs within a given set of presumptions that provides 
for the community of scientists a framework within which they operate and 
make their discoveries.  These presuppositions that cohere and form a 
paradigm, as it were, is for the most part, rarely questioned by the practising 
scientists themselves. It is only when the paradigm is unable to account for a 
significant number of anomalous results i.e. not explainable by the current 
framework, that a crisis is experienced and the old paradigm is replaced with a 
rival and new emergent one, leading to what Kuhn calls a scientific revolution.  
It is becoming widely accepted (but only) recently that the adoption of at least 
some metaphysical assumptions in scientific discourse cannot be avoided, as 
any cognition by means of scientific concepts and precepts invariably hinges 
on such presuppositions (Collingwood, 1940; Hübner, 1988; Popper, 1972). 
The defining characteristic of these presuppositions is that they are not the 
result of empirical discoveries nor truth-claims formulated within science 
(Dilworth, 2007; Holtzman, 2003). They are therefore extraneous to the 
scientific enterprise per se, yet they provide for science the basic categories so 
that together they cohere to form a framework within with scientific activity 
may be conducted. These categorical presuppositions govern all aspects of the 
enterprise, to the extent that they “practically recolour(ed) our mentality” 
(Whitehead, 1925) and become “the final controlling factor in all thinking 
whatever” (E.A. Burtt, 1932). Consequently, they pervade all aspects of the 
culture within which they emerge and embed themselves.  
That we can only think,21 and perforce have to, within some framework is 
acknowledged even by Quine (1960), and Popper (1970) when he concedes “I 
do admit that at any moment we are prisoners caught in the framework of our 
theories; our expectations; our past experiences; our language”. If there were to 
be no framework with its supporting set of preconceptions, then on what basis 
                                                          
21  MacIntyre (1986:4) goes so far as to assert that even rationality itself “is inescapably 
historically and socially context-bound”. 
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would a scientist demarcate his field of enquiry from the mass of perceptions 
out there, or where to begin with within that area or whether any investigation 
ab initio is warranted at all? Given the determining role of these ‘thought-
frameworks’ then, why are their presumptions so seldom subjected to any form 
of critique and readily taken as incontrovertible? 22   
There are two possible interrelated reasons for this. One is that at this level of 
analysis there is a clear overlap and intersection between ontological 23 
assumptions, epistemological concerns and methodological issues.24 We would 
not search for that which we did not believe existed out there, nor formulate 
any appropriate means25 to do so either.  As outlined earlier, one of the explicit 
aims of modernist science was to expunge all metaphysical notions from its 
repertoire of ‘meaningful’ concepts and idea. If any notion could not be 
operationally defined, or at the very least, did not have any observable 
implications, then to strive to even describe it had to be rejected as simply “the 
production of nonsense” (Ayer, 1936). Given such an uncompromising stance 
towards the metaphysical, ontology, or the question of being, was precluded 
from science (Chmielecki, 1998; Meador, 2003) and hence any deliberation on 
these issues branded as outright anathema.  
Secondly, despite the disavowal and hostility of modernist science towards any 
consideration of the metaphysical, during periods of intellectual crisis 
contemplation on these issues is irresistibly forced upon scientists.  But a 
reading of the history of science reveals that scientific revolutions, à la Kuhn, 
or, epochal shifts in thinking, Tarnas (1993), during which foundational 
propositions are re-examined, do not occur frequently. It may take centuries or 
even millennia for an old paradigm to be overthrown and a new one to emerge 
and mature; the Copernican heliocentrism in cosmology and quantum 
mechanics in physics are cases in point. And this also helps to explain, why, 
perhaps, the presuppositions that undergird scientific thinking in any one 
milieu generally are rarely, if ever, interrogated: practitioners and the broader 
public may never experience the need to (re)evaluate them in their individual 
                                                          
22 It is only when one experiences a severe intellectual crisis of perhaps existential proportions 
that one feels compelled by oneself to re-examine their hitherto unquestioned assumptions of 
thought and praxis. The celebrated examples of those who experienced this in the western 
world is Descartes (1596 –1650, cf. Descartes 1985) and much earlier in the Muslim world, al-
Ghazali (1056 –1111, cf. Hozien 2001) 
23 Ontology: the philosophical study of existence, or being (Craig, 1998). 
24 I.e. our conceptions about the nature and structure of the world impact on our quest to search 
for and discover that reality, and the means that we might adopt to gain that knowledge 
accordingly. 
25 Any of these as-yet unconceived entities, if ever ‘discovered’, will occur purely through 
accident but still necessitate some cognitive (re)orientation (Barnes 1982) 
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lifetimes. Furthermore, it is also conceivable that when an older paradigm is 
replaced, not all of its presuppositions are abandoned in toto. Some of them 
may become integrated into the new paradigm so that they continue to abide in 
scientific thinking for a long time to come.  
The above discussion serves to highlight several important issues: firstly, to 
debunk the notion that modernist science provides us with a neutral /purist 
view of the world, devoid of any preconceptions, howsoever scientists may 
aspire for this ideal. Secondly, these presuppositions are integral to any 
scientific enquiry and are invariably metaphysically located within some 
paradigm, which nonetheless can, under certain conditions, be revised or 
supplanted. Thirdly, these axioms that form the core of any scientific 
endeavour (Dilworth, 2007) and which establishes for it its conceptual 
paradigms (Smith, 2006) are rarely recognised as such, due to the aversion of 
modern science towards any form of transcendent notions and concepts outside 
of itself. 
AXIOMS OF MODERNIST SCIENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
ECONOMICS 
Several leading and distinguished scholars like E. Burtt (1924), Whitehead 
(1925) and Collingwood (1940) had even long before Kuhn argued very 
convincingly on the pivotal role of metaphysical assumptions in shaping 
scientific thought in any particular epoch26 What then are these presuppositions 
of modernist science that sets it apart it from its predecessors, or other, 
alternative ways of arriving at knowledge?  
At the onset of the Scientific Revolution, although there were three very 
different modes of learning that simultaneously emerged during that period (H. 
Cohen, 2005), these eventually melded and coalesced to shape for modernity 
its distinctive way of thinking about nature.  Throughout this period, from 
Kepler and Galileo through to Newton and Darwin and eventually Einstein, 
Schrödinger and Weinberg, there was the progressive development of just one 
fundamental idea, physicalism (Maxwell, 1984). Physicalism, or materialism, 
is the claim that ultimately, everything that exists is physical/material, or the 
result of physical processes (Seager, 1991; Smart, 1959). From this basic 
philosophy, emerged the two corollary axioms of modernist science, 
quantification(ism) and reductionism. How this happened is explained below.  
                                                          
26 But it is perhaps Burtt’s The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science (1924) that most 
lucidly demonstrates the paradigmatic shift towards the modernist conception of science from 
its early beginnings in the 1600s. 
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Science as Measurement and Quantification 
Despite the differences among the various strands of modernist science 
(Bartley, 1982), from the early rationalists and empiricists and those who 
succeeded them later (viz. la logical positivists) to the critical rationalists  (viz. 
Popper), all agreed that, at the very least, the basic ‘stuff’ that constituted the 
only referent for testing the validity of theoretical statements had to be sense 
data: “things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colors, 
sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on” (Russell, 1952). This at 
first, seemed straightforward: if the properties attributed to entities were 
observable, then assessing the validity of such claims is unproblematic because 
by merely observing an object one could ascertain if it possessed the claimed 
property (Suppe, 1974).  
But the realisation soon dawned that even this was not adequate enough to 
ensure objectivity. For example, since sense impressions and the internal 
experience of  an entity (e.g. heat) could vary between subjects and even by the 
same subject in different contexts,  raw sense data was not deemed incorrigible 
(Ayer, 1959) nor could private sensations form the basis of public, inter-
subjective knowledge assertions (Putnam, 1981), to overcome this limitation, 
only those traits of objects that are ‘subject-invariant’ could to be chosen for 
scientific purposes (Harre´, 1985) and furthermore, they had to satisfy the 
requirement of being “testable, intersubjectively, by ‘observation’” (K.R. 
Popper, 1959). This meant that henceforth, sense data which was previously 
empirical in its general connotation, was now further reduced and limited to 
only that which is quantitative and subject to measurable outcomes. Because of 
the close affinity between brute data, in this narrower denotation, and numeric 
information, the former could easily be mapped onto a numeric scale (Kanbur 
& Shaffer, 2007).27  
That measurement and quantification should become the defining feature of 
empirical evidence finds intellectual support not only from 20th century 
science. Its historical roots can be traced back to Descartes and Galileo who 
sought to describe nature in purely mathematical terms, and to do so, the 
scientist was called upon to focus only on the ‘essential’ properties of objects – 
that which could be measured and quantified (Capra, 1982; Dilworth, 2007). 
Quantity, rather than quality, was therefore the fundamental feature of all 
things that could be known, eloquently captured by Johannes Kepler when he 
                                                          
27 But as Williams (2000) argues, measurement scales themselves have social antecedents and 
thus not strictly value-neutral.  
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asserted: “just as the eye was made to see colors, and the ear to hear sounds, so 
the human mind was made to understand, not whatever you please, but 
quantity” (Kepleri, 1858 cited in Burtt, 1924). This notion was later epitomised 
in Hume’s famous remark: 
“When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what 
havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity 
or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any 
abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it 
contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and 
existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing 
but sophistry and illusion” (italics his [1777], 1902, pg. 104).28  
On this conception of human knowledge then, “Out go sight, sound, taste, 
touch and smell and along with them has since gone aesthetics and ethical 
sensibility, values, quality, form; all feelings, motives, intentions, soul, 
consciousness, spirit. Experience as such is cast out of the realm of scientific 
discourse.” Laing (1982), as Smith (2008) further asserts, the tacit assumption 
underlying this kind of epistemology is that quantity is the only thing that has 
objective reality. Consequently, with the rise and ascendency of science, with 
quantification its key yardstick, for truth to claim any sense of objectivity and 
universality, to enjoy the status of being ‘fact’ as opposed to ‘opinion’, it had to 
satisfy the criteria and modus operandi of empirical science. All claims that 
failed to meet this scientific standard came to be relegated to the category of 
the ‘subjective’ and is invariably considered no more within the purview of 
science and rationality (Capra, 1982; Smith, 2008; Trigg, 1993). 
The contraction of the knowable domain to only that which is measurable and 
quantifiable set the cast for the scientistic Weltanschauung. In this world-
picture, all matter is denuded of its qualitative characteristics, allowing only for 
the quantitative to have any meaningfulness. With this new vision “there are no 
mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in 
principle, master all things by calculation” (Weber, 1930). This 
phenomenalistic-quantitative interpretation of the world of being claimed to 
apply to all of science (Bartley, 1982; Olson, 1991). To this end, even the 
social sciences, despite the scale and diversity of phenomena that they dealt 
with, had to be explained with reference to a quantitative-physicalist language 
and vocabulary (Ayer, 1959). It evoked heated debate even within the natural 
                                                          
28 Thomson (1889), better known as Lord Kelvin, uttered a similar sentiment in 1883:“I often 
say that when you can measure what you are speaking about and express it in numbers you 
know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in 
numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind”. 
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sciences. The biologists, in particular, were particularly critical of what they 
perceived to be a form of intellectual imperialism of the physical sciences upon 
their domain of enquiry (Bartley, 1982; Mayr, 1969; Sheldrake, 2012). 
Reductionism 
Reducing the explanation of all phenomena, both living and non-living, to a 
physicalist paradigm and its categories necessitated the adoption by the 
different sciences, including economics, of its methodology as well (Dilworth, 
2007). Atomism, more often referred to as reductionism or methodological 
individualism, G. M. Hodgson (2007) holds that in any complex system, the 
behaviour of the whole can be completely understood from the properties of its 
individual parts.  The dominant method of inquiry to achieve this was 
reduction: using the analytical method, everything was to be reduced to its 
most indivisible parts to grasp its underlying structure and to determine the 
forces operating at that level. It involved having to dig deeper and deeper 
beneath the surface to discover the most fundamental elements29 that constitute 
matter in every field of human enquiry. The crusade of modern science thus 
was to decompose all of physical reality in search of its simplest constituents.  
Critically, it was believed that by understanding the functioning and purpose of 
individual parts separately, then through simple quantitative aggregation a 
comprehension of the whole could be attained.30 
Given this relatively novel approach to epistemic enquiry and the success that 
it begot vis-à-vis its application in technology, it received wide-spread support 
among its practitioners and the general populace. Science, narrowly conceived, 
appeared to have finally yielded to man the keys he eagerly sought to conquer 
Nature, to enable him, in the Baconian spirit, to “torture nature’s secrets from 
her”  and “bound (her) into (man’s) service” (Merchant, 1983). Within this 
reductionist, materialist worldview, science is alleged to have ultimately 
prevailed, fulfilling Nietzsche’s infamous announcement of the “death of 
God”.  All answers to the most vexing of questions to man and the universe 
around him, their origins and their futurity were to be sought exclusively in and 
from Science and its methodology alone.  
This reductionism in the human cognitive exercise and its subordination to the 
physical sciences begot the ideology of scientism: the doctrine that physicalist 
science alone could provide the most authentic worldview based on indubitable 
                                                          
29 For example, in physics, it was the atom; in chemistry, the elements in the periodic table, and 
in biology, the most irreducible component was the cell (Ackoff, 1993).  
30 This is expressed in the dictum that the ‘the whole is equal to the sum of its parts’.   
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knowledge which satisfied various criteria of objectivity. 31  Any knowledge 
claim has to satisfy, inter alia, the canons of neutrality and personal 
detachability, observability, measurability, testability, and communicability. 
On this account then, truth can only be searched for vis-à-vis materiality. The 
realm of matter alone, in this scheme, serves as the sole datum from and within 
which all spheres of knowledge may legitimately arise.  In this new vision 
“there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that 
one can, in principle, master all things by calculation” (Weber, 1930).  It is 
underpinned with a thoroughgoing philosophy of materialism-cum-physicalism 
(Maxwell, 1984), both with respect to its ontology and reductionist 
methodology. As Trigg (1993) argues, it is predicated upon “the enormous 
metaphysical assumption that the reality to which science has access is the 
whole of reality.”  
IMPACT ON ECONOMICS 
But it is economics, of all the social sciences, that most ardently and 
comprehensively embraced the model of rational mechanics (i.e. physics) as 
the idealised science to be emulated (Boldeman, 2007; Hosseini, 1990). All the 
way from the classical school, from Smith, Ricardo, Malthus and Mill through 
to the neoclassical-marginalist movement of Walras, Jevons and Menger, and 
later, Marshall, Pareto and Fisher, one finds that economic theory is fully laden 
and impregnated with the scientistic worldview. At the ontological level, just 
as Newton’s cosmos was fine-tuned by universal constants and celestial and 
terrestrial bodies reacted to a pull/push force (of gravity), so to was the 
economic sphere, calibrated by its own constants of human nature and social 
structure, subjected to the singular force of self-interest (Hamilton, 1999). In 
striking similarity, Smith and Malthus and later, Jevons, Marshall and 
Edgeworth, all used almost exactly the same ontological categories of physics 
to describe corresponding concepts and phenomena in economics.32  
The mechanistic-materialistic metaphor and imagery of classical physics was 
extended and pressed even further into economics. Notions (and processes) of 
market ‘forces’, the ‘self-adjusting mechanism’ of supply and demand, ‘stable 
equilibrium’, ‘cause-and-effect linear’ relationship between economic 
variables, the confining of  prosperity to ‘material’ welfare, the quantification 
of utility, etc. all manifest a commitment to a mechanical conception of a social 
universe in parallel to the physical one (Gordon, 1991; Keita, 1992). The 
                                                          
31 See Brownhill (1983) for a detailed exposition of how these criteria were understood. 
32 See Cohen (1994) for some illustrative examples and further discussion around this issue. 
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almost dogmatic-like believe in the equivalence of the two realms went so far 
that “some economists – Jevons, Walras, Fisher, and Pareto, among them – 
alleged   that their equations were identical (or very nearly identical) with those 
of rational mechanics” (I.B. Cohen, 1994). As Mirowski (1989) reiterates, 
“The further one digs, the greater the realisation that the neoclassicals did not 
imitate physics in a desultory or superficial manner; no, they copied their 
models mostly term for term and symbol for symbol”. Even beyond the micro-
economic level, by asserting that the (macro) economy is ineluctably driven by 
certain fundamental forces towards a given or deterministic end i.e. obeying 
natural and universal laws through the operation of causal mechanisms within a 
reified structure, Marxian and Keynesian economics reflect a similar 
Newtonian allegiance and character (Brown, 1972; Fay, 1975; King, 1994).  
The ambition to cast economics within the framework of a physicalist cum 
naturalist science received a further boost during the first few decades of the 
last century. Within the prevailing intellectual climate of positivism and 
reductionism, it was asserted that choices and decisions of agents in the 
economy could also be completely explained “by reference to complexes of 
physical laws” (Drakopoulos & Torrance, 1994). This reduction of human 
behaviour to materialist causes strengthened a version of causality that started 
with Blaug (1980), and consequently, entrenched the deterministic paradigm 
for economics. A further and significant implication of these developments was 
the notion of the uniformity and universality of economic laws so derived from 
this deterministic conception of economic behaviour, (see (Mill, 2008).  
The last aspect that is worthy of mention is the idea of rationality which lies at 
the heart of mainstream economics. The economic postulate that rational 
individualistic behaviour of economic participants can be simply aggregated 
(i.e. the additivity assumption see Hausman (2001) to reflect societal 
preferences evinces a clear commitment to the atomism of classical physics 
viz. that the whole is nothing more than the sum of its parts (King, 1994; 
Rosenberg, 1995). This methodological individualism remains a most sacred 
analytical principle in mainstream economic thought (Dupre, 2001; Gordon, 
1991; Kittel, 2006), despite the intractable problems that arise from its almost 
universal application in economics. But to give effect to this principle one 
more critical assumption had to be made: economic agents are motivated only 
by self-interest, as expressed by Benthams’s pleasure-pain nexus. An important 
aspect of this assumption was that this self-interest had to be measurable and 
hence the development of Ordinal Utility Theory. Economic theory was 
henceforth amenable to complete mathemathisation and discipline was finally 
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ready to become a fully-fledged ‘science’. The “Newton” of economics had 
finally arrived through the works of Paul Samuelson. Not surprisingly, he was 
the first American to win the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. 
But is human economic behaviour, individually or collectively, as deterministic 
as other physical systems, and driven only by a few fundamental forces of 
nature? Is there no place for free will, intent, creativity, teleology or moral 
choice? Is it realistically conceivable that the individual person constituted the 
most irreducible unit of analysis and that his context had only a peripheral 
influence, if at all, on his choices and decisions? Is it even possible to describe 
or explain the totality of human experience within a narrowly defined set of 
measurable parameters such as self-interest and utility? If the responses to 
these are in the negative, why then did economists so single-mindedly pursue 
this programme of imitating the physical sciences? 
Chapra (1992) and Mirowski (1989) are fully convinced that it was the allure 
of an ‘exact’ science like that of physics that the economists wished to emulate 
for economics; that physics was the role model of science and hence had to be 
modelled along its lines to lay claim to scientific status. Lawson (1997) 
similarly argues that it was the obsession with mathematics that led mainstream 
economics in the direction that it did. Rosenberg (1995) and Toulmin (1998) 
maintain that it arose from a metaphysical commitment to nature being in a 
state of equilibrium, changelessness, stability or a, “movement back towards a 
changeless state” (Rosenberg, 1995). As Toulmin implies, they felt prostrate 
before ‘the idol of stability’. More recently, other Nobel laureates such Stiglitz 
(2002) and Krugman (2010) have proffered that it was ideologically and 
politically inspired. Whatever the motivations, the implications for such a 
characterisation of the discipline have been most profound, an issue I will 
revert to later.  
Having expounded upon these essential features of mainstream economics 
within the modernist epistemology of science, I next review the core elements 
of Islamic science and its postulates. I will again particularise this analysis to 
economics and eventually conclude by elucidating to what extent, if any, 
Islamic economics could be subsumed within mainstream economics. 
WORLDVIEW OF ISLAMIC ECONOMICS AND ITS AXIOMS 
Islam has at its core the overarching and deeply-embedded reality of the 
Oneness and Unity of God (‘Tawhid’ – in Arabic), The Most High. The raison 
d’être of humankind’s creation is the recognition and actualisation of this 
 Mahomedya|Public Policy in Islamic Framework 
SHARE | Volume 4| Number 2| July – December 2015  
 
 
209 
Unity in the various socio-politico-economic contexts that humans finds 
themselves in.33  They are guided to this fulfilment through the agency of 
Revelation and Prophethood34 that God, The Most High had sent from time to 
time to the different nations of the world.  To facilitate mans’ earthly sojourn 
towards his permanent abode in the Hereafter, God has produced and made 
amenable for man’s beneficial use all that he finds on this earth. 35   Man, 
electing to have temporal mastery over much of this creation, therefore has to 
bear a weighty responsibility and solemn accountability for how he exercises 
this Vicegerency36 granted to him.  All that is observable (or not) in creation 
therefore has meaning and serves a distinct purpose and objective37 , for a term 
appointed, after which it will perish and cease to exist. 38    Humankind’s 
existence from beginning to end is therefore integral to the rest of creation in 
terms of both means and ends.      
But there is in addition, or rather, complementary to the Scripture of 
Revelation, the Scripture of Creation, through which man also gets to recognise 
and behold the Oneness of God and His most Sublime Attributes (see also 
(Paine, 1880). The Grand Design of the entire universe at the various multi-
levels of existence, within and between the animate and inanimate worlds; all 
reflect and manifest this Tawhidi precept of Oneness. The intra-and-inter-
systemic relationships between these world-systems occur through diverse 
forms of complementary relations of interactions and linkages, leading to 
systemic unity across the continuums of both time and space (Choudhury, 
2004). This divine law of Unity over-arches and pervades all of the socio-
scientific domains of existence such that it manifests itself most clearly all at 
levels of macro, meso and micro perception. As God, The Most High, declares 
in the Qur’an (Ch. 41: V.53) “We will show them Our Signs in the universe, 
and within their selves, until it becomes manifest to them that it is the truth. Is 
it not sufficient for you that your Lord witnesses all things?” Within such a 
scheme, God, though ontologically distinct and independent from creation, 
continuously interacts functionally, omnipotently and creatively within the 
                                                          
33 Al-Qur’an (Ch. 51:V.56). 
34 All the prophets from Adam to Noah, Abraham to Ishmael and Isaac and through Moses, 
David, Jesus and finally Muhammad, including some other prophets, (May the Peace of God 
be upon them all) are recognised as such in the Islamic Faith, and similarly so with regard to 
the Revealed books such as the Torah, The Psalms, the Bible and finally, the Qur’an. 
35 Al-Qur’an (Ch. 2:V.29). 
36 Al-Qur’an (Ch. 2:V.30; Ch.33:V.72). 
37 Al-Qur’an (Ch. 24:V.115). 
38 Al-Qur’an (Ch. 35:V.13; Ch. 55:V.26). 
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complexities of universal life (al-Attas, 1986; al-Ghazali, 1997; Choudhury, 
2011).  
A worldview premised on this conception of a single, unified (ontological) 
reality consequently demands an episteme that is correspondingly 
complementary to it. It should be capable of spanning across all systems, 
explaining both the particular and the universal, and integrating the a priori 
with the a posteriori. The process of learning has to be interactive, integrative 
and participatory within a unified framework that allows for multi-and inter-
disciplinarity and connectedness, though, as Choudhury (2006) reminds us, 
different problems could be dealt with by systems more specific to them. Such 
a general systems methodology requires the invoking of the Qur’anic 
Revelation (referred to earlier) and the Prophetic tradition, navigated 
appropriately through the use of humanly-endowed faculties of reason and 
observation. It is through this continuous process of evolutionary learning that 
man may comprehend with ever-increasing degrees of certainty all that can be 
possibly known.  
That human life, nay, all of creation exists within such an organismic whole 
and therefore requires a holistic approach to comprehend its reality brings into 
sharp focus the very notion and validity of disciplinary boundaries. Activities, 
both human and non-human, in the real world do not occur as isolated or 
discrete moments of events, each spatio-temporarily separated from the other. 
Any authentic understanding of them therefore simply cannot be divided into 
watertight compartments marked ‘economics’, ‘sociology’, ‘psychology’, 
‘anthropology’, etc. As the Nobel Laureate economist Gunnar Myrdal (1979) 
concluded:  
“I came to see that in reality there are no economic, sociological, 
psychological problems, but just problems and they are all mixed 
and composite. In research the only permissible demarcation is 
between relevant and irrelevant conditions. The problems are 
regularly also political and have moreover to be seen in historical 
perspectives.” 
Economics, perhaps more than any other social science, reflects this multi-
disciplinary character and classical Islamic scholarship was most keenly aware 
of this interconnectedness. Consequently, in all of the earlier writings 39  
                                                          
39 Islahi (2005) has undertaken an encyclopaedic review of not only the role and impact of 
medieval Muslim scholars in Islamic economic thought but also their influence in the evolution 
of mainstream conventional economics. 
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economic issues were always examined as a subset within the unified social 
and moral philosophy of Islam (Chapra, 1996). Any contemporary revival of 
Islamic science would thus also have to carefully re-consider the utility, if any, 
of maintaining current academic disciplines. In all likelihood, these artificial 
boundaries may blur and disappear altogether, eventually coalescing to form 
super-disciplines that better capture and explain the totality of experience of 
real-world phenomena.  
If all of creation has a transcendental link and is intrinsically related to man and 
his destiny then morality, values and ethics play a central role within the 
framework of the Islamic knowledge enterprise. It was this very value system, 
which sparked and sustained the phenomenal rise of science during the early 
periods of Islamic history (Kettani, 1984). Islamic science and economics has 
to therefore explicitly and unapologetically serve and promote the values of its 
worldview (Manzoor, 1991; Sardar, 1988). But more importantly, as 
Choudhury (2011) forcefully argues, its moral law and ethics have to be 
“organically functional and endogenously embedded” within the general 
system of causal and complimentary relations from which they are derived and 
within which they logically operate. Without this relational reference, they will 
remain isolated from its fundamental premise of Oneness, and as a result, will 
need to be exogenously imposed with all the associated difficulties that this 
entails.  Within the Tawhidi epistemological framework, these ethics will guide 
human behaviour as they derive and find expression through the continuous 
processes of learning and participation. So crucial is the role of ethical 
behaviour in even the this-worldly felicity of man, that his external 
environment and the conditions that prevail therein are in large part a reaction 
and response to the choices that he makes in this regard.40     
The last distinguishing feature of Islamic economics to emerge from its 
ontological and epistemological roots is the explicit recognition of the 
qualitative, the unmeasurable, the unknowable and the hidden, and their 
(potential) role on the outcome of worldly events. The Qur’an for example is 
replete with verses affirming these notions and phenomena.41  The need to 
incorporate them into the very constitution of Islamic economics are inevitable 
if one wishes to uncover and appreciate the richness, complexities and dynamic 
forces that continuously interact and integrate in the real world. It responds to 
the call for greater inclusivity of different modes of methodological enquiry 
(Anees, 1984; Tebes, 2005), recognises the multidimensional world of nature 
                                                          
40 Al-Qur’an (Ch. 30:V.31). 
41 See for example, Al-Quran (Ch. 18, V.7; Ch. 2; V3; Ch. 74; V31) 
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(Ford, 1984), factors in the indelible influence of habit, culture and history in 
explaining especially economic behaviour (Hosseini, 1990; Zaman, 2013), and 
explicitly acknowledges that our knowledge of the world will always remain 
imperfect and incomplete.  
The admission of these qualitative or non-observable variables should not 
provoke concern that Islamic economics will degenerate into the occult, 
anarchy or dogmatism. Nor does it imply that it will necessarily lose all sense 
of ‘objectivity’. The value system that underpins the Islamic faith will prevent 
this outcome and thus help to assuage any concerns in this regard. Islamic 
economics may still be as ‘objective’ and ‘rational’ as the Secular sciences, 
though it would draw its legitimacy and authenticity from a different 
philosophical base (S.H. Nasr, 1976). As Sardar (1985) clarifies, “Islamic 
science [and economics] is subjectively objective; that is, it seeks subjective 
goals within an objective framework”. Furthermore, contemporary pioneers 
and leaders in this field such as Choudhury42  have adequately demonstrated 
through rigorous methodological and logical formalism how the Tawhidi 
knowledge centred worldview, applied to diverse socio-scientific systems, 
yields results that are intellectually acceptable and rationally satisfying as a 
scientific and explanatory praxis. 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Given the above discussion, it is clear that the Modernist paradigm of science 
and that of Islamic economics are too distinct and divergent from each other to 
be reconciled harmoniously. At both the ontological and epistemological levels 
their axioms are fundamentally incompatible, largely because of sharp 
differences in their worldviews. Not surprisingly therefore, the very form and 
substance of their knowledge enterprises are unique. Consequently, their 
programmes and outcomes are naturally expected to differ.   
Returning now, therefore, to the original point of departure: how should 
Islamic economics proceed with its agenda? Until now most of the literature on 
Islamic Economics, particularly those that attempted to construct the discipline 
on the foundations of modern science, has produced an admixture of 
(sometimes contradictory) notions, theories and policies (Kuran, 2004; 
Mahomedy, 2013; Philipp, 1990). This divergence in the characterisation of the 
discipline was bound to occur due to the application of differentiated thought 
processes that arise out of rationalist epistemology. As a result, the groundwork 
                                                          
42 See the list of references for some of his works. 
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of thought on the subject had become vitiated and the vision for a unified 
premise for Islamic Economics remains heretofore largely unfulfilled. And this 
is the fundamental thrust of the argument that writers on Islamic Economics 
have remained oblivious to; an authentic science of (Islamic) economics can 
only be established upon an irreducible premise that is both self-referencing 
and universal, so that it can explain the world as a uniﬁed macro-system 
including all its micro-system parts (Choudhury, 2008a).  
That Islamic Economics could have as its epistemological premise the 
development of a science undergirded by its distinct worldview is not unique, 
nor does it militate against the aims of economic enquiry. Modern economics, 
in all its shades and varieties, whether of its classical-neoclassical, Keynesian 
or Monetarist, Marxist or Institutionalist types, are all value-laden and 
ideologically or politically driven, as previously indicated. They are predicated 
upon by implicit (and sometimes explicit) sets of presuppositions, rarely 
acknowledged or even recognised as such by their proponents. These 
presuppositions are not arbitrarily selected nor chosen on the basis of any 
neutrally-objective criteria. Though often cloaked in the garb of positivist 
science, the various schools of economics actually serve a distinct agenda, a 
point emphasised quite convincingly by Myrdal (1958), Schumpeter (1949), 
Heilbroner (1988), and Robinson (1962).43 What is perhaps to a greater degree 
less known, is that even the natural sciences, beneath their veneer of a purely 
empirical enterprise, adopt a set of metaphysical assumptions44 which form the 
core of modern science (E.A. Burtt, 1932; Dilworth, 2007; Safi, 1996) and 
which establishes for it its conceptual paradigms (Smith, 2003, 2006). Clearly 
then, no scientific enquiry may ever claim to be a presupposition less activity. 
If the Islamic scientific schema (in which economics would be but an integral 
component) is indeed, as argued above, incompatible with Modernist science, 
does it necessarily imply that any sense of rationality is therefore altogether 
absent from its repertoire of intellectual tools? Certainly not. The Quraan45 in 
fact, enjoins upon man in no less than 750 verses (about one-eighth of the total) 
to employ his perceptual and intellectual faculties to reflect on the study of 
nature (Atighetchi, 2007). Consequently, rational modes of enquiry such as 
                                                          
43 Even Milton Friedman (1953, pg. 3-4) himself was forced to acknowledge in this respect,  
“Laymen and experts alike are inevitably  tempted to shape positive conclusions  to  fit 
strongly held normative preconceptions and to reject  positive conclusions  if  their  normative 
implications -  or what are said to be their  normative implications - are unpalatable”. 
44  These epistemological and ontological presuppositions are rarely acknowledged, less so 
subjected to critical scrutiny by the scientific community (See Smith, 2003). 
45 The final Divine Book of Revelation sent down to God’s Last Prophet, Muhammad 
(P.B.U. H).   
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deduction and induction have always formed an integral part of scientific 
enquiry and application in Islamic scholarship. The Muslim World had already 
many centuries prior to the Scientific Revolution in Europe, embraced the 
methods of ratiocination and experimentation in scientific enquiry which they 
subsequently transmitted to the Latin West (Draper, 1875; Durant, 1980; 
Gilson, 1955; Haskins, 1924; Lewis, 2009). As long as these methods were 
integrated within the fundamental epistemological and ontological premise of 
what Choudhury (2008a) terms, Tawhidi phenomenology, Muslim scientists 
were able to richly cultivate and develop the various natural and social sciences 
harmoniously 
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